The Frontline in Ukraine: June 2025 Post

Summary of operations for June, 2025

The Russian command continued to maintain the Sumy Direction as a significant priority, but small advances have been at the cost of heavy casualties. Two directions saw gains of over 10 kilometers in June. First, exploitation of the tactical breakthrough from Vozdvyzhenka has mostly been channeled to the north west, which continues to threaten both Toretsk to the southwest and Kostiantynivka to the northeast. Second, to the south, Russian advances along the Vovcha river and the N-15 Highway westwards towards Novomykolaivka threaten to unhinge the south of the Ukrainian line and create an operational level threat. Steady advances continue in other sectors, with the most worrying being to the northwest of Kupyansk, where the Russian bridgehead over the Oskil continues to expand. Russian casualties remain high.

Russian forces remained committed to their respective sectors. June was not marked by any significant shuffling of forces from one sector of the front to another. However, Ukrainian military analyst Konstantin Mashovets believes that the 106^th Airborne Division (Sumy Oblast) may be trying to either withdraw some units into the second echelon or to be redeployed to another sector of the front.

From north to south, the main areas of combat operations:

Russian Group of Forces North

Sumy Oblast:

Continued Russian attacks here, using all of the units used to force Ukraine out of Kursk Oblast, indicate that this direction now has particular importance for the Russian High Command. Russian forces advanced roughly 3.5 kilometers deeper into Sumy Oblast, reaching a number of border villages including Yablunivka. Russian forces still struggle to gain complete control over Yunakyivka. Mashovets believes it is too early to consider that the Russian offensive in Sumy Oblast has been stopped, as Russian forces have not yet ceased attacks and gone over to the defensive and because the current reduction in the number of attacks is clearly due to the reduced combat effectiveness of Russian front-line units due to heavy casualties.

The Russian units committed to this sector do not appear to be controlled by any corps or army headquarters, and are coordinated directly by Group of Forces North. This is likely complicating coordination, especially of indirect fire and drone assets. This Group of Forces does not appear to have been reinforced recently and still consists of the 76^th Air Assault Division, 106^th Airborne Division, 11^th and 83^rd Air Assault Brigades, the 217^th Airborne Regiment/98^th Airborne Division, the 40^th (elements) and 155^th Naval Infantry Brigades, 177^th Naval Infantry Regiments, 200^th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and elements of the 18^th and 72^nd Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD). There is, however, some indication (see above) that the 106^th Airborne Division is either preparing to transfer to another sector or at least to withdraw some elements into the second echelon for replenishment.

Belgorod Oblast: Ukraine continues to maintain a narrow lodgment here.

Kharkiv Direction (focus around Vovchansk): Continued Russian attacks, but no movement of note. (11^th and 44^th Army Corps, minus elements of the 18^th and 72^nd MRDs deployed in Sumy Oblast).

Kupyansk Direction: Russian forces made progress towards Kupyansk both on the west side of the Oskil, with fighting now in Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and Radkivka; and on the east side, with Russian forces approaching the northeast suburbs of Kupyansk. Incremental Russian advances were also noted elsewhere from the bridgehead over the Oskil and around the Ukrainian salient on the east side of the Oskil. Gains over the last several months have been small, but have now accumulated to the point where the supply route into Kupyansk could soon be threatened (6^th CAA and 1^st Tank Army, minus three regiments shifted further south to reinforce the 20^th Combined Arms Army’s assault from the Zherebets bridgehead).

Western Group of Forces: Note: the boundary between the Northern and Western Group of Forces runs through Kupyansk, with the 6^th CAA belonging to the Northern and the 1^st Tank Army belonging to the Western Group of Forces.

Lyman Direction: Russian forces pushed somewhat further to the west of Ridkodub and continue to threaten an encirclement of Zelene Dolyna. They continue to attempt to consolidate previous gains to the south around Yampolivka and Torske. (20^th and 25^th CAA, plus two regiments from 1^st Tank Army).

Southern Group of Forces

Siversk Direction: Russian forces continued to make regular advances around the Siversk salient, advancing from Hryhorivka to Serebrianka (just over 3 km, on the northeast sector of the salient). Additional advances were made from the east of Siversk, from Verkhnokamianske and from the south, to Pereizne.

Chasiv Yar Direction: Continued Russian attacks, with advances north of Chasiv Yar towards Novomarkove and to the west, towards Mykolaivka. Both advances were approximately three kilometers. (3^rd CAA, 3^rd Army Corps, and 98^th Airborne Division (minus one regiment)).

Kostiantynivka Direction: This axis comprises Russian attacks in Toretsk and from Vozdvyzhenka and is currently the main Russian effort. The Russian salient originally formed by successful attacks north from Vozdvyzhenka that cut the highway from Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka back in January and then expanded significantly in May, has now achieved additional success in attacks to the northwest towards Novotoretske and to the west, towards Mykolaivka. Most of Yablunivka is still in Ukrainian hands, with Russian advances here and from Toretsk in the east minimal. (8^th CAA, elements of the 51^st CAA, and the 68^th Army Corps).

Central Group of Forces

Pokrovsk Direction: I don’t consider this direction to be the Russian main effort any more, but do believe that it remains closely associated with the ongoing attacks in the Kostiantynivka direction. The Russian forces in this salient still threaten both Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, although it would be difficult for them to sustain attacks in both directions simultaneously. Again, this month there was minimal movement of the front lines. (41^st and 2^nd CAA).

Southern Group of Forces

Novopavlivka Direction: Renewed Russian progress in the last month, amounting to about three kilometers. (elements of the 90^th Tank Division, elements of the 51^st CAA and a brigade of the 5^th CAA).

Novomykolaivka Direction: Significant Russian progress in the last month along the N-15 highway that runs to Zaporizhzhia. Russian forces advanced along the south bank of the Vovcha approximately ten kilometers from Bahatyr to Komar. (5^th, 29^th, and 36^th CAA plus a brigade of naval infantry.). This direction doesn’t have the same level of priority as others, but regularly makes excellent progress, equaling or exceeding advances of directions with higher priority.

Hulyiaipole Direction: Russian forces have increased attacks and there is fighting in Malynivka, which may have falled to Russian Forces. Mashovets believes that this direction has recently been activated by the Russian high command (35^th CAA (- the 64^th Brigade and part of the 69^th Brigade are in Kursk).

Orikhiv Direction: Nothing significant to report. (58^th CAA plus regiments of the 7^th Airborne and 76^th Air Assault Divisions.

Kherson Direction: Nothing significant to report. (49^th and 18^th CAA, 104^th Air Assault Division and 61^st Naval Infantry Brigade).